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Abstract: 
Literature on the relationship between aid and inequality is scarce and contradictory. 
Most studies are based on dynamic panel data using internal instruments to deal with 
endogeneity. In addition to these techniques, this article introduces the persistency of 
inequality and a double-censored Gini index. We apply for the first time a dynamic and 
double-censored panel data estimated applying the Simulated Maximum Likelihood 
method to a sample of 18 Latin American countries for 1990-2008. The main findings 
are that public expenditure in consumption and foreign direct investment had a positive 
effect on inequality whereas aid had a negative (egalitarian) effect. Neither taxes nor 
public social spending had a significant effect on inequality. 
 
KEYWORDS: dynamic panel data, double censored panel data, inequality, foreign aid, 
Latin America. 
JEL: C23, C24, F35. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Latin America is the most unequal region in the world. Gini indexes across the 
continent’s countries are the highest even when taxes and transfers are taken into 
account (Goñi, López and Servén 2011). Some institutional and historical studies have 
attributed this fact to colonialism, its institutional influence (Engerman and Sokolof 
2002) and to natural capital and factor endowments (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
2002). Recent studies have shown that Latin America was not always such an unequal 
region in the long run (Williamson 2009, Milanovic 2009, Prados de la Escosura 2007 
a, b). Moreover, there is a generalized reduction of inequality across Latin American 
countries since 2002 (Gasparini & Lustig 2011; Lustig et al 2011). 
The main goal of this article is to identify what variables explain inequality levels and 
variations in 18 Latin American countries from 1990 to 2008. Specifically, our goal is 
to find out whether foreign aid has had a significant effect on inequality reduction.  
Although literature on the relationship between aid and growth is abundant, this is not 
the case for aid and inequality. Literature on aid and growth is still controversial (see 
McGillivray et al 2006) even when meta-analysis techniques are used. Whereas the 
meta-analysis of Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011) does not find any significant effect 
of aid on growth, Mekasha & Tarp (2011) show positive results using meta-analysis as 
well. There are some recent studies showing a positive link using a variety of robust 
econometric techniques (Dovern & Nunnenkamp 2007; Nowak-Lehmann 2009; Minoui 
& Reddy 2010; Arndt et al. 2010, 2011; Juselius et al. 2011 and Tezanos et al 2012 for 
the Latinamerican case). 
The relationship between aid and inequality has been studied to a lesser extent. 
Bornschier et al (1978) found that aid has a positive effect on income inequality, as well 
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as foreign investment. Dolan & Tomlin (1980) do not confirm this seminal result and 
find no significant correlation between aid and inequality for 1970-1973. Cuesta et al. 
(2006) found a negative relationship between aid and inequality using an ordered probit 
with annual data for 1995-98, but the effect was very sensible to sample countries and 
regions. In Latin America the effect was the lowest and the lower initial inequality was, 
the lower was the effect identified. Under the donor countries perspective, Chong & 
Gradstein (2008), using World Values Surveys data, found an inverse relationship 
between income inequality in the donor country and citizen agreement with foreign aid. 
Using cross-country regression and dynamic panel data, Chong et al (2009) found no 
significant effect of aid on inequality or poverty. Layton & Nielson (2008) and 
Bjørnskov (2010) found a positive relationship between aid and inequality in the form 
of a regressive effect. Both studies identified a stronger regressive effect in democratic  
countries but did not in autocratic. The result is partially explained by rent-seeking 
activities and by the fact that aid is captured by local elites. This fact is also found by 
Angeles and Neanidis (2010) and Holder and Raschy (2010). 
Reviewing these results is interesting because it is often assumed that aid reduces 
poverty and that poverty can be reduced, not only through economic growth, but also by 
reducing inequality. If aid is pro-poor it should reach the poorest among income 
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distribution. In fact, international summits and OECD-DAC High Level Fora have 
explicitly remarked inequality reduction as one of the goals behind aid1. 
We study income inequality under three vectors of variables: redistributive policies, 
human capital and labour market institutions, and external financial flows. While 
addressing the empirical relationship between aid and inequality, we deal with the 
intrinsic characteristics of inequality. In other words, we bear in mind heterogeneity and 
persistence of inequality, multicollinearity among regressors and endogeneity. 
Moreover, for the first time, a double-censored estimation technique is used (because 
the fitted Gini must be between the [0-100] interval) and time series are considered 
stationary.  
This robust methodology will allow us to know if the most unequal region of the world 
has been positively affected by foreign aid or not. Conversely to previous literature, it 
also allows to know the persistence and heterogeneity among sample countries.  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
1 Among others, the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000 states that: “#2. We recognize that, 
in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility 
to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level”; and in “#6. We 
consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. 
These include: Equality. No individual and no nation must be denied the opportunity to benefit from 
development. The equal rights and opportunities of women and men must be assured”. The Paris 
Declaration (OECD 2005) says:”#2. At this High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, we followed up on 
the Declaration adopted at the High-Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003) and the 
core principles put forward at the Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Development Results 
(February 2004) because we believe they will increase the impact aid has in reducing poverty and  
inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating achievement of the MDGs”. Finally, the 
Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 2008) states: “#3. We need to achieve much more if all countries are to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Aid is only one part of the development picture. 
Democracy, economic growth, social progress, and care for the environment are the prime engines of 
development in all countries. Addressing inequalities of income and opportunity within countries and 
between states is essential to global progress”. 
 
 
5
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodologies for a 
consistent estimation of inequality. Section 3 describes the data used and the statistic 
analysis of variables. Section 4 shows the results under different methodologies and 
section 5 concludes.  
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2. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Empirical studies on the relation between aid and inequality have to solve an initial 
problem, the size of the sample. This disadvantage does not allow obtaining consistent 
results. To solve this, other authors have used panel data among others econometric 
methodologies, i.e. the studies consider this relation simultaneously for a sample of 
individuals and periods. Following this formulation, we express a general model as a 
linear panel data: 
  (1) , , , ,
1,..., 1,...,
i t i t i t i t i tEQ X Y Z
i N t T
a b g= + + +
= =
,e
Where is inequality index value (Gini) in a year t and for a country i.  ,i tEQ
,; ; i t, ,i t i tX Y Z
,i te
éêë ùúû
)
)
 are regressor vectors with annual values of variables that show 
redistributive policies, human capital and labour market institutions and external 
financial flows, all of them for the same country and year as the dependent variable. 
Finally,  is residual. 
In expression (1) we are interested in the relation between aid and inequality, but there 
are other idiosyncratic effects (heterogeneity), known as individual effects. There are 
two ways to isolate the individual characteristics of common effects: 
Fixed effects, i.e. effects that are constant for all periods: 
  (2) ( 2, , , 0,i t i i t i tu u iide l s= + 
Random effects, or variables in each moment: 
  (3) ( ) ( 2, , , , ,0,1 0,i t i t i t i t i t iu u iid iide l l s= +  
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The choice depends of the correlation between each regressor and this effect, i.e. if it is 
null (fixed) or not (random). We use the usual Hausman test for taking a decision. If the 
effect is fixed, we use OLS to estimate the expression (1); but if the effects are random, 
the consistent estimation method is WITHIN.  
Next, we have to identify if data panel is static or dynamic. A priori, as a dependent 
variable with lags is not a regressor, we would think of a static model. But, as the 
above-mentioned literature shows, there is an inverse causality relation between the 
dependent variable and each regressor, which leads to endogeneity.  
Besides the problem of endogeneity, multicollinearity problems could arise to the 
relations among the regressors. To avoid these drawbacks, we proceed as follows 
First, we estimate the correlation matrix of the regressors. If two regressors have a 
significant correlation (±10%, or higher in absolute value), we do not include them 
simultaneously in the model to avoid problems of multicollinearity. 
Next, we estimate expression (1) with each of the isolated regressors. Then we analyze 
the residual to test for endogeneity, and reject the regressors for which the hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation is not accepted. We continue to include regressors and to test the 
autocorrelation of residuals, until we obtain the model with the highest goodness of fit 
degree, measured by 2R .  
In the context of individual effects, multicollinearity and endogeneity, the consistent 
estimation method for a static panel data is GLS weighted by the covariance matrix of 
the residuals from the previous estimates WITHIN and BETWEEN [see Arellano, 
2003]. 
If static models estimated using this procedure have autocorrelation in the residuals, we 
should define a dynamic model and estimate it by GMM with instrumental variables to 
 
 
8
 of endogeneity. Usually, the instrument is a delayed dependent 
variable, both in levels and in difference, resulting in the SYS-GMM methodology. 
Existing literature already applies the methodology described above, but not to a Latin 
American sample. In order to overcome endogeneity, we want to analyze the persistence 
of inequity. We shall use a delayed dependent variable not simply as an instrumental 
variable, but also as a regressor. 
Then, expression (1) with autoregressive is: 
  (4) , , , , , 1
1,..., 1,...,
i t i t i t i t i t i tEQ X Y Z EQ
i N t T
a b g r -= + + + +
= =
,e
,
<
We estimate the expression (4) by SYS-GMM AR(1), which has not been used in 
previous literature to study the persistence of inequality. 
Another feature not considered in existing literature is that the observed dependent 
variable is double-censored: Gini index has lower (0) and upper (100) bounds. Then, the 
truncation requires a nonlinear panel data model that allows to take into account the 
other properties mentioned (individual effects, endogeneity, multicollinearity and 
autoregressive). The model is: 
  (5) , , , ,
,
, , ,
,
*
1,..., 1,...,
0 0
* 0 100
100 100
i t i t i t i t i t
i t
i t i t i t
i t
EQ X Y Z
i N t T
if EQ
EQ EQ if EQ
if EQ
a b g e= + + +
= =
ìï £ïïï= <íïï ³ïïî
To estimate expression (5) in the presence of individual effects and endogeinity, the 
usual instrumental variables cannot be used [see Honoré and Hu (2004)]. Honoré and 
Hu (2004) study alternative techniques as GMM modified, Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations, Symmetrically Censored Least Squared and Maximum Likelihood. But 
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their proposal considers that the variable is truncated only at the lower bound and, they 
do not include different autoregressive parameters for each individual, then, as 
Wooldridge (2005) indicates, the flexibility of Maximum Likelihood allows us to 
design the behavior of the dependent variable in greater detail. 
Among the possible alternatives, Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) allows the use 
of more complex dependency structures, i.e. random effects and autoregressive different 
for each individual. 
To implement SML, we define the log-Likelihood function for a double-censored 
(lower and upper bounds) model as: 
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      (6) 
Where  and f  are the normal accumulated distribution and density functions, 
respectively. 
F
Next, we define the variance and covariance matrix structure to show autocorrelation 
and heterogeneity with different parameters for each individual:  
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                (7) 
To identify the model, we need to normalize parameters by , so residuals have a 
standard normal distribution with mean zero and unit variance. 
2
us
Then, we estimate SML by Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator [Gourieroux 
and Monfort (1993); Hajivassiliou, et al. (1996); Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998); 
Geweke and Keane (2000)]. For that, we apply Choleski decomposition of covariance-
variance matrix. But, as this is a block diagonal matrix, we can operate independently 
with each individual. Thus, Choleski decomposition for an individual is: 
                                                                      (8) 
,1,1
,2,1 ,2,2
, ,1 , ,2 , ,
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T
i i i
i
i i
i
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c
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We implement GHK simulator for any individual as follows: 
Generate T (number of years observed) random numbers from standard normal 
distribution and, we transform it as: 
 
 
11
   
( ) ( )
,1,1 1 1
,2,1 ,2,2 2
, ,1 , ,2 , ,
0 0
0
0,1 0,
i
i i
i i
i T i T i T T T T
i i
c
c c
C
c c c
C
x h
x hh x
x h
x h
æ ö æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷= ⋅ = ⋅ =ç ç ç÷ ÷ç ÷ ç ç÷÷ç ÷ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç ç÷ ÷ ÷ç ç÷ç è ø è øè ø
F F


     

 
2 ÷÷÷÷                          (9) 
Then, for each instant, we calculate the simulated value or the value truncated, if it is 
higher (lower) to bounds: 
1
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Where U is the uniform distribution. 
For an instant the simulated likelihood function value is: 
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We repeat the first three stages R times. So, for an individual, the SML mean is: 
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Finally, SML of panel data is: 
 ( )
1
1
, , ,
N
i
i
LL LL
NT
a b g
=
W = å  (13) 
Then, we apply the usual optimization techniques (quasi-Newton, in particular we use 
BFGS method or Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfard and Shanno) to maximize the expression 
(13). We estimate the parameters’ standard errors by information matrix (Hessian 
inverse). 
We obtain the regressor parameters, the standard deviations of random effects and, the 
inequality persistence or autoregressive. Then, while SYS-GMM method estimates a 
unique autoregressive parameter, SML method allows us to estimate one for each 
country. But, as standard deviations include R+, and autoregressive parameters are in the 
interval [-1, 1], we have to redefine it and maximize on the parameters p: 
 ) ,2,
,
0, 1, 1
1
i
i i i
i
p
p
p
r
s
r
s ré é= Î +¥ = Î - +ë ë+ ùû                           (14) 
As the results of maximization are very sensible to starting values of parameters, then 
we use values of a previous optimization, i.e. the initial parameters are obtained by the 
Simulated Anealing procedure taking as initial values those obtained from dynamic 
panel data. 
Finally, if the dependent variable and its first difference are not stationary, the 
procedures suggested would not be valid, therefore requiring a stationary transformation 
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 the original series. Otherwise the variables could present a cointegration relationship, 
which requires a different methodology. 
A usual transformation is a relative variation to study how regressors’ variations explain 
annual variations observed in the inequality index. Several secondary objectives are 
achieved: first, both the regressors and the dependent variable are expressed in the same 
terms (percentage), so that the interpretation of the parameters is more straightforward; 
and second, it avoids the problem of modeling a censored dependent variable. In this 
case, the model is: 
 
, , , , ,
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This transformation usually solves problems of endogeneity and autoregressive, so the 
model is estimated as a static panel data by GLS. 
 
3. DATA 
We use the data compiled by Martorano and Cornia (2011). Their database has annual 
Gini observations for 18 Latin American countries. The period of analysis is 1990-2008. 
We transform the variables measured in relative terms (% of GDP) into levels, using the 
World Bank World Development Indicators. Levels of net disbursements of aid are 
taken from the OECD-DAC database.  
The first step was to select among the potential variables those that theoretically where 
more closely linked to inequality (see the models in Cornia 2011 for Latin America and 
Eastern and Central Europe countries; Robinson 2009 for Middle East and Robinson 
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2010). Cornia 2012 is very close to our work, but he does not considerer ODA as 
regressor and our empirical methodology is more accurate than his approach. A 
correlation matrix was computed with this preliminary group and those with a 
significant correlation over ±10% were rejected due to their multicollinearity problems. 
Finally, the regressors were grouped as follows (see Appendix A for details and 
sources): 
Domestic redistributive and productive indicators (X): Pub_exp is general government 
final consumption expenditure; SOC_tot is Social public expenditure; Tax is Tax 
revenue (including social contributions); Cpi is the Consumer Price Index; Agr and Ind 
are the primary (agriculture) and secondary (industry) sectors in terms of GDP, 
respectively. Government consumtion, social public expenditure and tax revenue are 
expected to have negative signs, because they precisely try to redistribute income. 
Moreover, a very inequal income distribution impact on tax revenues trough informal 
sector that will hinder tax collection, and through elites rent-seeking activites, that will 
be reluctant to pay taxes and to accept more progressive tax reforms .Alonso & 
Garcimartin (2011) have found a negative impact of low taxes on inequality trough 
institutions. Inflation is expected to have a positive correlation with Gini index. 
Distortions in process and lack of credit acces of the poor could explain the effect. 
(Cornia 2011). Finally, Agriculture and Industrial are indicators for structural change. 
Ponce and Vos (2012) think that inequality reduction in El Salvador, for example, will 
not longer maintain due to the lack of structural change. 
Labour institutions and human capital (Y): Hc_low is the share of adults aged 25-65 
with 0 to 8 years of formal education; Hc_medium is the share of adults aged 25-65 
with 9-13 years of formal education; Hc_high is the share of adults aged 25-65 with 
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more than 13 years of formal education; Un is unemployment; Mw is the index of 
nominal minimum wages deflated by countries. The higher differences among years of 
schooling, the higher inequality. Unemployment is expected to have positive relation 
with inequality and minimum wages are expected to have a negatie impact on inequality 
[see for instance Campos et al. (2012) in the case of Mexico; Klasen et al. (2012) for 
Honduras; Contreras and Ffrech-Davis (2012) for Chile]. 
External redistributive flows (Z): Tot1 represents international terms of trade; Fdi is net 
foreign direct investment stocks; Remittance is workers’ remittances receipts; Aid is 
net ODA received (% of GNI); Aidpc is aid per capita, for sensibility analysis; ODA is 
Overseas Development Assistance, as defined by DAC; millions of dollars at 2009 
prices.  Terms of trade can be used as countercyclical policy and could have a negative 
impact on Gini index, as Cornia 2012 has found. FDI is high in some Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) and its effect could be mixed. On the one hand, FDI 
can expand profits and revenues of the higher income quintiles, whereas, on the other 
hand, if international firms employ low-skilled workers (such as in maquilas) they can 
reduce inequality. Remittances have been found as crticical factor in reducing inequality 
in El Salvador (Acevedo & Cabrera 2012) because they increase the income of lower-
income households (although not the lowest, because the poorest can not migrate). 
ODA is expected to reduce inequality because the flow, unless theoretically, is oriented 
to reduce poverty. 
Dependent variable (EQ): Gini is the Gini index on income, calculated on a mixture of 
net income and gross income concept.  
For further analysis, we split the whole sample into two subsamples: one for the lower 
middle-income Latin American countries (following CEPAL 2010 criteria, these are 
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Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay) and the 
other for the upper middle-income countries2. 
Table 1 shows sample countries, observations and some descriptive statistics for levels 
and first differences.  
 
[Insert around here Table 1] 
 
The panel is unbalanced mainly because Gini observations were not available for all 
countries and years. Gini average reaches 52.39 with a maximum of 61.70 (Bolivia in 
2000) and a minimum of 41.20 (Venezuela in 2008). Standard deviations show a wide 
dispersion (1.095-3.181), which means a strong heterogeneity among sample values. 
Additionally, all time series show order 1 autocorrelation [Box-Pierce test, Q(1)], 
except Honduras and Peru. In other words, inequality is highly persistent.  
Two tests for stationarity were run: the standard Dickey-Fuller Augmented (DFA) and 
other more consistent for small samples, such as KPSS. This selection is explained 
because panel data unit roots tests are average variations around DFA (Im et al., 2003) 
and KPSS (Hadri, 2000). Taking into account both tests, only Argentina, Panama, Peru 
and Venezuela are not stationary in levels. Considering first differences time series, the 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 The only difference between CEPAL and other classifications for lower middle-income countries such 
as World Bank or DAC is Ecuador who is considered upper middle-income country. 
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autocorrelation only applies for Chile and Honduras, whilst unit roots tests only reject 
stationarity for Argentina. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. 
Our first step was to analyse the individual effects (fixed or random) using the Hausman 
test. Table 2 shows the results for the three samples considered.  
 
[Insert around here Table-2] 
 
As it can be seen, the Hausman test is not rejected in any of the samples. This implies 
random effects estimation for all models. Bearing in mind these results, we estimate 
model [1] as a static panel data with random effects. The consistent estimation 
procedure is GLS. Results are shown in Table 3.  
 
[Insert around here Table-3] 
 
Table 3 shows order 1 autocorrelation in residuals. This means that income inequality 
persistency and endogeneity are detected in Latin American data. The consequences of 
these facts are that the results are not consistent. 
To deal with this limitation we transformed the model into a dynamic panel data and re-
estimated it. Table 4 offers the results. 
 
[Insert around here Table-4] 
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Table 4 shows different results when series in levels or in first differences are used. 
Considering the previous result that some series in levels are not stationarity, we 
continue the estimation using the transformed series. First of all, Sargan test shows the 
validity of instruments. The main factors explaining inequality are: 
Domestic redistributive policies; only public consumption (Pub_exp) is statistically 
significant in all samples and its sign is positive. That is, the higher public consumption, 
the higher inequality is. The effect is more remarkable in upper middle-income 
countries. 
Human capital and labour market institutions: low human capital (hc_low) is positive 
and statistically significant for the total sample and for lower middle-income countries. 
High human capital (hc_high) is positive and significant for the upper middle-income 
countries sample. Unemployment (Un) is also positively correlated in upper middle-
income countries. 
External financial flows: terms of trade (Tot1) have a positive and significant effect in 
all samples (either in levels or first differences). The effect is higher in lower middle-
income countries. Foreign direct investment (Fdi) in differences is also positive and 
significant in the total sample and lower middle-income countries. Foreign aid (Aid) is 
negative and significant for lower middle-income countries. In other words, aid has had 
an egalitarian effect in the seven Latin American lower middle-income countries.  
To sum up, public consumption, years of formal education (human capital) and labour 
market institutions are significant domestic factors to explain income inequality in Latin 
America. External factors do too: foreign investment increases inequality whereas 
foreign aid reduces it. Interestingly enough, remittances were not significant. 
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In a further step, we deal with inequality persistence. We estimate an autoregressive 
panel data model in order to study the influence of this feature. Table 5 shows the 
results. 
 
[Insert around here Table-5] 
 
As Table 5 shows, inequality persistence is significant in all samples. The higher effect 
is in the upper middle-income countries. Public consumption remains positive and 
significant whilst terms of trade are not when lagged inequality is introduced in the 
model as an instrumental variable. Foreign direct investment and low human capital are 
still positive and significant in lower middle-income countries, whereas aid is still 
negative and significant. An interesting novelty is that remittances are now positive and 
significantly correlated with inequality in the mentioned subsample. 
 
We also deal with the non-linearity of inequality. To our knowledge, this is the first 
time it is done. We consider a double-censored dynamic panel data. In this model, 
heterogeneity and autocorrelation parameters are estimated individually. Each sample 
country has its own estimation. Table 6a shows the parameters associated to regressors, 
whilst Table 6b shows the parameters for individual effects under random heterogeneity 
and autocorrelation. 
  
[Insert around here Table-6a y b] 
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As Table 6a shows, taking into account individual random effects and autocorrelation 
does not change our main results. Public consumption, low human capital, 
unemployment, terms of trade and foreign direct investment are positively correlated 
with inequality (although in the upper middle income countries, FDI is negative). Aid is 
still negative and significant for the total sample and for the lower middle-income 
countries.  
Table 6b shows that inequality persistence is more significant in upper middle-income 
countries (only Ecuador shows a significant parameter among lower middle-income 
countries). The Ecuadorian value fits between 0.67 and 0.98, which indicated a high-
income inequality autocorrelation. Remarkably enough, random effects are fairly high 
and different among countries. Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela show high 
values, whereas Brazil, Mexico and Panama have lower levels of this feature.   
Finally, to deal with the non-stationarity assumption, we estimate a static panel data 
model (15) in first differences by GLS. Table 7 shows the results. 
 
[Insert around here Table-7] 
 
In this case, human capital (medium and high) and foreign direct investment explain 
significantly inequality among upper middle-income countries. In lower middle-income 
countries, unemployment and aid (this time in per capita terms) are significant 
predictors of inequality.  
It is worth enough mentioning that the use of differenced series reduces 
multicollinearity among regressors. This fact explains that agricultural (for the lower 
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middle-income sample) and industrial (in the case of upper middle-income sample) 
value added are now significant.  
Remarkably enough, none of the public spending variables (except educational and for 
total sample) were statistically significant. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Whereas the relationship between aid and growth has been largely investigated, this is 
not the case for aid and inequality. Latin America is the most unequal region all over the 
world. These facts justify the interest of this paper. 
Literature has organised drivers of inequality around three vectors: domestic 
redistributive and productive policies; human capital and labour market institutions; and 
trade and external financial flows.   
We use an empirical approach to the study of inequality in 18 Latin American countries 
for 1990-2008. We deal with endogeneity, autocorrelation and multicollinearity. We use 
static and dynamic panel data, autoregressive and double-censored models.  
Contrary to previous literature, we find that aid has had an egalitarian effect in Latin 
American countries. In addition, public consumption, human capital, unemployment, 
terms of trade and foreign direct investment have a positive and significant relationship 
with income inequality. Remarkably enough, neither taxes nor social public spending 
and remittances are significantly linked to inequality.  
The results are stronger in the case of the lower middle-income subsample.   
Finally, persistence –measured as first order autocorrelation- is higher in upper middle- 
income countries than in lower middle-income countries. Conversely, dispersion does 
not discriminate incomes. Countries with the highest dispersion are Argentina, Bolivia, 
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Peru and Venezuela, whilst Brazil, Mexico and Panama are the countries with the 
lowest dispersion. 
Some policy lessons could be derived from our findings. Firstly, if ODA flows have had 
an egalitarian impact in Latin America, the cuts of the amounts of ODA or the abandon 
of the continent by some donors. Should be revised. Second, ODA flows could go hand 
in hand with cash transfers. Donors could allocate a substantial pari of their ODA in 
cash transfers funds. This would imply higher ownership, use of local procedures and 
systems, higher alignment and could increase mutual accountability. In contrast, donors 
could lose political influence, but Paris-Accra-Busan principles for aid effectiveness 
would be enhanced. Lastly, our result should neves imply an excuse for not carry on the 
unavoidable fiscal reforms that Latin American countries need. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.  
Data in levels 
Countries observ. min mean max std.dev ADF test KPSS test Q(1) test p-value 
Argentina 19 44.432 48.358 53.264 2.572 -1.837 0.289 13.958 [0.0002]** 
Bolivia 18 49.400 56.359 61.703 3.181 -2.112 0.466 12.060 [0.0005]** 
Brazil 19 54.214 58.269 60.379 1.786 -2.507 0.682 13.948 [0.0002]** 
Chile 19 51.822 54.289 55.451 1.201 -0.611 0.479 15.336 [0.0001]** 
Colombia 19 51.320 55.657 58.900 2.100 -1.856 0.598 12.224 [0.0005]** 
Costa Rica 19 43.956 46.711 49.884 1.925 -1.041 0.616 10.459 [0.001]** 
Dominican Republic 19 47.208 49.895 51.998 1.363 -1.544 0.347 6.358 [0.0117]* 
Ecuador 14 50.157 55.360 58.822 2.399 -0.114 0.523 7.469 [0.0063]** 
El Salvador 19 46.102 50.547 53.446 2.128 -0.219 0.469 10.403 [0.0013]** 
Guatemala 17 53.227 56.056 58.221 1.420 -0.081 0.509 6.793 [0.0092]** 
Honduras 19 52.765 55.249 58.252 1.491 -1.772 0.559 2.456 [0.1171] 
Mexico 19 49.760 52.604 54.717 1.680 -0.403 0.541 17.057 [0.0000]** 
Nicaragua 14 50.220 53.237 56.331 2.141 -1.419 0.482 12.731 [0.0004]** 
Panama 19 52.093 55.235 56.653 1.095 0.545 0.319 6.270 [0.0123]* 
Paraguay 14 52.139 55.797 58.377 1.763 -0.125 0.434 5.330 [0.0210]* 
Peru 18 46.400 50.604 55.538 3.022 -1.813 0.185 1.695 [0.19297] 
Uruguay 19 42.114 43.947 47.056 1.541 -0.098 0.671 14.418 [0.0001]** 
Venezuela 19 41.200 44.882 47.633 2.196 -1.979 0.190 8.171 [0.0043]** 
Data in first differences 
Countries observ. min mean max std.dev ADF test KPSS test Q(1) test p-value 
Argentina 18 -3.332 0.022 2.798 1.457 -2.218 0.299 1.023 [0.3118] 
Bolivia 17 -3.234 0.158 4.700 2.234 -4.306 0.120 1.079 [0.2989] 
Brazil 18 -1.021 -0.342 0.105 0.337 -2.250 0.513 3.158 [0.0755] 
Chile 18 -0.913 -0.177 0.316 0.368 -1.995 0.328 7.676 [0.0056]** 
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Colombia 18 -1.102 0.388 2.257 0.941 -2.613 0.088 0.030  [0.8619] 
Costa Rica 18 -1.223 0.261 4.098 1.322 -3.194 0.070 2.549 [0.1104] 
Dominican Republic 18 -3.529 0.061 1.976 1.310 -2.965 0.095 1.177 [0.2780] 
Ecuador 13 -3.717 -0.510 0.986 1.317 -2.054 0.263 0.290 [0.5899] 
El Salvador 18 -3.578 -0.320 1.290 1.359 -3.184 0.148 1.216 [0.2702] 
Guatemala 16 -2.576 -0.208 2.011 1.187 -6.306 0.039 0.303 [0.5818] 
Honduras 18 -3.654 0.101 2.950 1.717 -4.332 0.076 4.033 [0.0446]* 
Mexico 18 -1.411 -0.092 0.971 0.687 -3.226 0.316 1.972 [0.1602] 
Nicaragua 13 -1.340 -0.249 1.664 0.924 -0.712 0.187 0.355 [0.5511] 
Panama 18 -1.392 -0.162 1.106 0.779 -2.960 0.380 0.000 [0.9977] 
Paraguay 13 -2.917 -0.480 0.944 1.095 -2.499 0.130 0.022 [0.8828] 
Peru 17 -6.670 0.037 3.763 2.767 -3.091 0.232 0.474 [0.4911] 
Uruguay 18 -2.364 0.130 1.305 0.885 -5.784 0.130 3.145 [0.0762] 
Venezuela 18 -4.161 -0.072 2.296 1.711 -2.713 0.316 0.155 [0.6936] 
Note: (*) and (**)denote significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. ADF test is stationary test with intercept and without trend; H0: variable is I(0); the significant values to 
reject H0 are -3.43; -2.86 and -2.57 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. KPSS is stationary test without trend; H0: variable is I(1); the significant values to reject H0 ar 0.74, 
0.46 and 0.35 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Q(lag=1) is autorregresive Box Pierce test with H0: No serial correlation; we accept H0 when prob. is high [Q < 
Chisq(lag)]. 
Table 2. Hausman test 
Samples Hausman test p-value 
Whole sample 1.6438 [0.9901] 
Lower middle income 4.9012 [0.6720] 
Upper middle income 5.0260 [0.5405] 
Note: H0 is that the estimates of random effects and fixed effects do not differ substantially, if H0 is 
rejected then select a fixed effects model. 
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Table 3. Results of static panel data estimated by GLS within-between. 
Samples Whole sample Upper-middle income Lower-middle income 
Regressors Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob Coefficient t-prob 
pub_exp 0.1067 [0.015]* 0.2133 [0.031]* 0.5556 [0.000] ** 
tot1 -0.0273 0.237         
Fdi 0.0651 [0.003]** 0.0782 [0.001]** 0.0378 0.115 
Remittance -0.0831 [0.000] ** -0.3565 [0.018]* -0.1040 0.141 
Aid -0.2649 0.224 -0.6651 [0.046]* -0.3371 [0.002]** 
Cpi         0.0314 [0.041]* 
hc_low 0.6000 [0.018]** 0.5905 [0.000] **     
hc_medium 0.1825 [0.000] **         
hc_high 0.8431 [0.001]** 0.1405 [0.013]*     
Un 0.2513 [0.000] ** 0.8515 [0.000] ** -0.5895 [0.000] ** 
R^2 63.87% 49.53% 59.79% 
AR(1) test N(0,1) 4.737 [0.000] ** 5.989 [0.000] ** 4.5283 [0.000]** 
AR(2) test N(0,1) 0.4873 [0.626] 1.642 [0.101] 1.384 [0.166] 
 Note: (*) and (**)denote significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 4. Results of dynamic panel data estimated by SYS-GMM. 
Samples Whole sample Upper-middle income Lower-middle income 
Dynamic 
model 
None 
transformations 
Differences 
transf. 
None 
transformations Differences transf. 
None 
transformations 
Differences 
transf. 
Regressors Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob 
pub_exp 0.7344 [0.003]** 1.2183 [0.000]** 1.6335 [0.000] ** 1.6313 [0.000] ** 0.9295 [0.000] ** 0.8470 [0.024]* 
tot1 0.1665 [0.000]** 0.0885 [0.000]** 0.1811 [0.019]* 0.0844 0.0650 0.1063 [0.000] ** 0.0703 [0.003]** 
Fdi 0.0870 [0.216] 0.1428 [0.004]** 
-
0.0560 0.2280 0.0085 0.9190 0.1430 [0.000] ** 0.0864 [0.000] ** 
remittance 0.0900 [0.690] 
-
0.0157 0.9350 0.6147 0.0660 0.4134 0.2710 -0.1557 [0.081] 
-
0.0569 0.641 
Aid -0.3039 [0.115] 
-
0.2784 0.3410 4.0510 0.1560 7.0779 0.0960 -0.4634 [0.000] ** 
-
0.1827 [0.020]* 
hc_low 0.4283 [0.000]** 0.4481 [0.000]**         0.4221 [0.000] ** 0.4760 [0.000] ** 
hc_high         0.4066 0.1900 0.5812 [0.015]*         
Un         0.2741 0.2220 0.5936 [0.000] ** 0.7547 [0.000] ** 0.3525 0.064 
Sargan test 68.36 [1.000] 43.98 [1.000] 79.51 [1.000] 46.29 [1.000] 44.05 [1.000] 15.97 [1.000] 
AR(1) test 2.642 [0.008] ** -2.302 [0.021] * 2.367 [0.018] * 0.2441 [0.807] 1.147 [0.251] -1.851 [0.064] 
AR(2) test 2.483 [0.013] * -1.143 [0.253] 1.88 [0.060] 0.3973 [0.691] 0.02299 [0.982] 0.2803 [0.779] 
 
Note: (*) and (**)denote significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Results of AR(1) dynamic panel data estimated by SYS-GMM. 
Samples Whole sample Upper-middle income Lower-middle income 
Dynamic 
model 
None 
transformations 
Differences 
transf. 
None 
transformations 
Differences 
transf. 
None 
transformations 
Differences 
transf. 
Regressor
s Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob 
gini(-1) 0.9095 [0.000] ** 0.8080 [0.000] ** 0.9771 [0.000] ** 0.8989 [0.000] ** 0.7111 [0.000] ** 0.6843 [0.000] ** 
pub_exp 0.1027 0.0800 0.3067 [0.000] ** 0.1002 0.283 0.2798 [0.037]* 0.4267 [0.000] ** 0.4925 [0.001]** 
tot1 0.0007 0.9380 0.0007 0.9400 -0.0120 0.3150 -0.0096 0.4150 0.0061 0.689 0.0113 0.541 
Fdi 0.0100 0.3940 0.0130 0.3370 -0.0058 0.5370 -0.0345 0.3250 0.0387 [0.040]* 0.0356 0.165 
remittanc
e -0.0107 0.6380 0.0114 0.8610 -0.0429 0.5430 -0.0123 0.9280 -0.1435 [0.000] ** -0.1394 [0.012]* 
Aid -0.0696 0.0950 -0.1488 [0.040]* 0.5540 0.2930 1.2023 0.0950 -0.1394 [0.002]** -0.1519 0.078 
hc_low 0.0557 [0.019]* 0.1034 [0.001]**         0.1435 [0.000] ** 0.1495 [0.000] ** 
hc_high         0.0576 0.4930 0.0980 0.5840         
Un         0.0007 0.9910 0.0827 0.1910 0.1557 [0.000] ** 0.1400 [0.030]* 
Sargan 
test 138.1 [0.930] 185.6 [0.119] 108.9 [1.000] 134.1 [0.952] 41.96 [1.000] 83.58 [1.000] 
AR(1) test -1.169 [0.242] -2.843 [0.004] ** -1.145 [0.252] -2.189 [0.029] * -1.694 [0.090] -1.674 [0.094] 
AR(2) test 0.2624 [0.793] 0.6785 [0.497] -0.8665 [0.386] 0.3905 [0.696] -0.8597 [0.390] 0.3478 [0.728] 
 
Note: (*) and (**)denote significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6a. Results of double censored dynamic panel data estimated by SML (parameters). 
Samples Whole sample Upper-middle income Lower-middle income 
Regressors Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob 
pub_exp 0.3175 [0.026] * 0.3733 [0.002] ** 0.6372 [0.000] ** 
tot1 0.0146 [0.027] * 0.0302 [0.006] ** 0.0543 [0.062] 
fdi 0.0533 [0.031] * -0.1041 [0.026] * 0.1059 [0.000] ** 
remittance -0.0380 [0.457] -0.0219 [0.481] -0.0533 [0.151] 
aid -0.0490 [0.041] * 0.0811 [0.131] -0.2439 [0.023]* 
cpi         -0.0992 [0.517] 
hc_low 0.5702 [0.000] **    0.6001 [0.000] ** 
hc_medium 0.4498 [0.394]        
hc_high 0.6756 [0.000] ** 0.4372 [0.000] ** -0.8933 [0.000] ** 
un 0.1063 [0.000] ** 0.2817 [0.000] ** 0.2536 [0.036]* 
pseudo-R^2 98.85% 98.53% 98.95% 
AR(1) test 1.187 [0.235] 1.473 [0.141] 1.621 [0.105] 
AR(2) test 1.116 [0.264] 1.184 [0.236] 1.551 [0.121] 
 
Note: (*) and (**)denote significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. Specifically, 2500 simulations have been performed and have discarded the first 500 to obtain a better 
convergence of the simulated process. 
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Table 6b. Results of double censored dynamic panel data estimated by SML (persistence:  rho, heterogeneity: sigma). 
Samples Whole sample Upper-middle income Lower-middle income 
Countries Rho t-prob Sigma t-prob Rho t-prob Sigma t-prob Rho t-prob Sigma t-prob 
Argentina 0.8245 [0.011] * 1.5270 [0.000] ** 0.7893 [0.000] ** 1.6642 [0.000] **         
Bolivia 0.6846 [0.041] * 1.7140 [0.000] **         0.7165 [0.043]* 1.6772 [0.000] ** 
Brazil 0.9748 [0.000] ** 1.1237 [0.004] ** 0.9636 [0.000] ** 1.2033 [0.000] **         
Chile 0.9814 [0.000] ** 1.1343 [0.002] ** 0.9833 [0.000] ** 1.5680 [0.000] **         
Colombia 0.9246 [0.000] ** 1.2543 [0.006] ** 0.9464 [0.000] ** 1.4739 [0.000] **         
Costa Rica 0.7059 [0.008] ** 1.2779 [0.003] ** 0.7234 [0.048] * 1.5409 [0.000] **         
Dominican Republic 0.4665 [0.465] 1.4296 [0.000] ** 0.6613 [0.548] 1.2938 [0.000] **         
Ecuador 0.9449 [0.000] ** 1.3989 [0.000] **         0.9007 [0.009]** 1.4204 [0.000] ** 
El Salvador 0.8677 [0.024] * 1.1975 [0.000] ** 0.7960 [0.000] ** 1.2578 [0.000] **         
Guatemala 0.6408 [0.213] 1.4115 [0.000] **         0.4636 [0.339] 0.9112 [0.001] ** 
Honduras 0.2590 [0.472] 1.3933 [0.000] **         0.2471 [0.657] 1.0360 [0.000] ** 
Mexico 0.9443 [0.000] ** 1.1333 [0.000] ** 0.9588 [0.000] ** 1.1575 [0.000] **         
Nicaragua 0.8623 [0.004] ** 1.2338 [0.002] **         0.8718 [0.032] * 1.2360 [0.000] ** 
Panama 0.8752 [0.061] 1.4277 [0.000] ** 0.7267 [0.096] 1.0960 [0.000] **         
Paraguay 0.8294 [0.173] 1.1691 [0.000] **         0.8895 [0.221] 1.3476 [0.002] ** 
Peru 0.5765 [0.328] 1.9449 [0.000] ** 0.5367 [0.461] 1.8847 [0.000] **         
Uruguay 0.7642 [0.026] * 1.1547 [0.000] ** 0.7742 [0.000] ** 1.3118 [0.000] **         
Venezuela 0.6833 [0.045] * 1.4645 [0.000] ** 0.6681 [0.036] * 1.7853 [0.000] **         
 
Note: (*) and (**) denote significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 7. Results of relative variations static panel data estimated by GLS within-
between. 
Samples Whole sample Upper-middle income Lower-middle income 
Regressors Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob Coef. t-prob 
SOC_tot     0.0107 [0.343] 0.0002 [0.988] 
SOC_edu -0.0137 [0.031]*         
Tot1 -0.0343 [0.015]*         
Fdi 0.0085 [0.022]* 0.0084 [0.031]* 0.0052 [0.738] 
remittance -0.0003 [0.808] -0.0009 [0.455] 0.0032 [0.427] 
AIDpc 0.0001 [0.722] 0.0003 [0.921] -0.0126 [0.042]* 
Un 0.0214 [0.004]**     0.0273 [0.005]** 
hc_medium -0.1559 [0.001]** -0.1855 [0.004]*     
hc_high 0.0638 [0.002]** 0.0967 [0.000] **     
Agr         -0.0368 [0.071] 
Ind     -0.0383 [0.011]*     
R^2 10.93%   12.30%   15.49% 
AR(1) test -1.767 [0.077] -0.8197 [0.412] -1.729 [0.084] 
AR(2) test -1.068 [0.285] -0.0592 [0.953] -1.44 [0.150] 
Note: (*) and (**) denote significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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 APPENDIX A. LIST OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES 
Dependent variable: 
Gini= Gini index on income, calculated on a mixture of net income and gross income 
concept (see IDLA Appendix 2 for details).  
Domestic redistributive and productive indicators (Xt): 
Pub_exp= general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (WDI) 
SOC_tot=Social public expenditure as percentage of GDP (CEPALSTAT) 
Tax= Tax revenue (including social contributions) as % of GDP (CEPALSTAT) 
Agr= Agriculture Value Added (as a % of GDP) (WDI) 
Ind= Industry Value Added (as a % of GDP) (WDI) 
Cpi= inflation measured by the average consumer price. Data for inflation are averages 
for the year, not end-of-period data. The index is based on annual percent change 
(WEO) 
Labour institutions and human capital (Yt): 
Hc_low=share of adults aged 25-65 with 0 to 8 years of formal education (SEDLAC) 
Hc_medium=share of adults aged 25-65 with 9-13 years of formal education 
(SEDLAC) 
Hc_high=share of adults aged 25-65 with more than 13 years of formal education 
(SEDLAC) 
Un=Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (WDI) 
Mw=index of nominal minimum wages deflated by countries’ CPI (2000=100). The 
indicator corresponds to the minimum wages for the formal sector (CEPALSTAT) 
External redistributive flows (Zt): 
Tot1=international terms of trade, fob (2000=100) (CEPALSTAT) 
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Fdi=Net foreign direct investment stocks measured as percentage of GDP (UNCTAD)  
Remittance= Worker’s remittances receipts as percentage of GDP (USAID, UNCTAD, 
WDI) 
Aid=net ODA received (% of GNI) (WDI) 
Aidpc= Aid per capita (WDI) 
ODA= Overseas development Assistance, as defined by DAC; millions of dollar at 
2009 prices (OECD-DAC) 
 
 
